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This compact study focuses on the three major policy influencing enterprise 
reports of the last three decades; Telesis 1982, Culliton 1992, O'Driscoll 2004 to 
determine the policy orientation of the Irish Government over the last 30 years. 
Expanding on a framework put forward by Dennis to categorise policy orientation 
of governments, we examine the path of policy making in Ireland and find that 
Irish policy has a resolute focus on interventions to support successful risk taking 
and has assiduously avoided considering reducing the effects of failure. From our 
analysis we also find that there has been no significant directional change in 
policy making in the O'Driscoll report 2004, in spite of calls from Europe since 
2000 for countries to review insolvency legislation and make it easier for honest  
entrepreneurs to make a 'fresh start'.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been a drive by governments across the world to promote 
entrepreneurship. This drive has been spurred on by a recognition of the relative 
importance of small entrepreneurial firms in the development of national economies 
(Storey, 2003). In the 1960s small scale enterprises w re associated with technological 
backwardness and believed to be of little economic value. Galbraith (1957) pointed out 
that there was good reason to believe that the economies of scale generated by large scale 
firms was vastly superior to smaller firms in almost every aspect of economic activity. 
The origins of this belief can be traced back at lest as far as Karl Marx (1912, p.836) 
who believed that the entire social capital would end up in the hands of one single 
capitalist or corporation. An alternative view, stemming from the writings of Joseph 
Schumpeter, put much more emphasis on the important ole of small firms in an 
economy. According to this view small firms are thesource of technological change, they 
create competition and make markets more dynamic, they create new markets and create 
more new jobs than large firms (Acs and Audretsch, 1993). Furthermore Audretsch 
(2003, p. 5), goes on to say that entrepreneurship has now “become the engine of 
economic and social development throughout the world.” In 2000 president of the 
European Union, Romana Prodi, announced plans to transform Europe into the most 
entrepreneurial region in the world by 2010, and Stel, Storey, Thurik and Wennekers 
(2006) note that policy makers in different countries have now also focused more 
attention on entrepreneurship. In its’ 2003 report, the European Commission (2003, p. 9), 
stated that "[t]he challenge for the European Union is to identify the key factors for 
building a climate in which entrepreneurial initiative and business activities can thrive."  
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In light of this challenge, this compact study examines the interaction between academic 
research on entrepreneurship and Irish government policy in recent decades. Almost 
every ten years since 1982 the Government has commissioned a blue sky consideration of 
business policy in Ireland and the last three have uniformly noted an over-reliance on 
Foreign Direct Investment and an under-performing idigenous entrepreneurial sector 
(Telesis,1982; Culliton, 1992; and O'Driscoll, 2007). Recent governments tasked with 
further improvement have started to focus on stimulating entrepreneurship, with 
measures including the funding of 62 business incubation centres, offering a range of 
funding schemes for start-ups, providing entrepreneurship training and offering direct 
business advice. The question must be asked however whether the correct incentives are 
being put in place to aid the creation of an entrepreneurial economy? 
Rather usefully Dennis (2004) sets out the two main areas that are routinely focused upon 
by governments as they set about supporting entrepren u ship:  
• Lowering barriers to establishment, expansion and growth. 
• Providing advice, support and finance from public funds.  
According to Dennis, European countries take a very different approach to the USA, 
which broadly favours the first policy option over the second, whereas until recently, EU 
countries have in general favoured the second. The European Council in Lisbon in 2000 
set out to recast the EU’s approach to entrepreneurship, adopting a more American 
model. In 2003 these policies were formalised in an EU Green paper (Entrepreneurship in 
Europe) that is starting to impact on member states legi lation. This Green paper took up 
the call from a number of economists (such as Lundström and Steveson, 2002; Djankov 
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et al., 2002; Armour and Cummings; 2005) to reduce the ‘stigma of failure’ through 
reducing the severity of bankruptcy regulations. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of Irish industrial policy 
from the time of creation of the Irish Free State. This will give context to the research and 
will also present the reader with an impression of the main trends in the development of 
enterprise policy since political separation from Great Britain in 1922. Section 3 will 
follow with an examination of the Telesis (1982), Culliton (1992) and O’Driscoll (2004) 
reports and categorise the recommendations of each. Section 4 will look at public policy 
on entrepreneurship and finally section 5 will be a discussion on the findings of the 
examination and provide comment on any persistent tr ds or biases in policy decisions. 
 
2. EVOLUTION OF THE IRISH ENTERPRISE POLICY 
On the periphery of Europe, without road or rail access to the continental mainland, 
Ireland, a small agricultural country was a prosperous if inequitable component of the 
United Kingdom, before eventually seceding in 1922. Establishment of the new Free 
State was accompanied by a short lived but bitter civil war (1922-23), after which the 
main political objective of the country was development of economic policies that would 
support and substantiate Irelands’ independence from Britain (Lee, 1989). The period 
from the 1930’s to 1950’s was characterised by high tariffs and strict prohibition of 
foreign ownership of firms operating in Ireland. Justification of these ad hoc protectionist 
policies was the belief in the merits of self-sufficiency, and was also an attempt to 
promote import substitution and encourage output and employment in indigenous 
industry. From a political perspective these policies proved successful and also did 
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moderately well economically in the short term, at least until the end of World War II. 
From 1932 to 1938 an estimated 1,000 new factories were established and employment in 
manufacturing increased by over 50,000, up 50% from the beginning of the decade 
(Review of Irish industrial policy and performance, 2003: 30).  
By the 1950’s the weaknesses of protectionist policies became apparent, as Ireland 
underperformed the rest of Western Europe in raising tandards of living and in terms of 
job creation. The post-war era from 1950-1975 is often characterised by economic 
historians as the “Golden Age” of European growth, as countries devastated by the war, 
grew faster than at any other period during the twen ieth century (Van Ark and Crafts, 
1996), however this upsurge was not experienced in Ireland. Mass emigration ensued, 
with an estimated half a million people leaving Irish shores during the 1950’s (Gray, 
2004).1 By the end of the 1950’s it was widely accepted that Ireland required a 
fundamental transformation of economic strategy. Table 1 outlines the main economic 
policies of the 1950s. After 1958 there is a notable change in focus from protectionist to 
free trade orientated policies. 
 
2.1. Transformation of the Irish Economy: 1960’s-1980’s 
Having lost two elections in 1948 and 1954, when Fianna Fail re-gained control of 
government in 1957, de Valera realised that it was time to change the path of economic 
policy making. Although not a proponent of the free market, he was a shrewd politician 
and appreciated that the old remedies had not been a political or economic success. Sean 
Lemass, who had been in a long standing battle withSean MacEntee as to the course 
Fianna Fail should take in economic policy, was given the scope to reshape economic 
                                                
1 This was an estimated one sixth of the total population.  
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conditions, as he saw fit when MacEntee was relegated from finance in 1957 (Murphy, 
1997). 
Lemass appointed a young civil servant, T.K. Whitaker to the position of Secretary of the 
Department of Finance, and in 1958 Whitakers’ report on ‘Economic Development’, 
“announced the simple fact that Irish capitalism had come to a dead end” (Allen, 1990). 
Whitaker, who had looked abroad to policy making of other countries, changed the 
economic landscape of Ireland with his wide ranging plans for economic development 
and broke away from policies of economic nationalism. Irish economy and industry was 
transformed under the force of new policy direction which can be summarised under 
three main areas, (i) a move away from self-sufficien y, towards policies which promoted 
economic openness, (ii) tax incentives and grants to foreign firms who set up in Ireland; 
and (iii) abolition of import tariffs and other barriers to international trade flows. These 
policies resulted in a huge shift away from agriculture to industry in terms of both the 
contribution to GDP and share of employment. In 1960 exports of merchandise 
contributed to 27% of GDP, this figure rose to 75% in 2000, by which time Ireland had 
become one of the most open economies in the OECD (Review of Irish industrial policy 
and performance, 2003). The new economic strategy implemented from 1958, moved 
away from over-reliance on native industries and towards attracting FDI. This saw 
sustained growth in productivity and output over the following two decades. However, 
certain of defeat in the general elections of 1977, Fianna Fail leaders got together and 
drew up a manifesto offering the electorate an array of tax breaks and dramatic increases 





Evolution of Irish Industrial Policy: 1930s-1950s 











Large increases in tariffs on a wide range of imported goods. 
Control of Manufactures Act restricts foreign ownership of Irish firms. 
Establishment of Industrial Credit Corporation to provide finance for native industry. 
Establishment of Industrial Development Authority to promote industrial development. 
Establishment of An Forfas Tionscail to give grants of up to 100% of cost of land & buildings 
and 30% of cost of machinery to companies setting up in under-developed areas of the country. 
Industrial Grants Acts provides that grants of up to 2/3rds of cost of land and buildings can be 
given for new industry in all parts of the country. 
Finance Act gives 50% remission on tax on profits from exports. Finance Act of 1958 increases 
tax relief to 100%. Finance Act 1960 extends export tax relief for 15 years with tapering relief for 
a further five years 
 






Economic Development 1958: ‘sooner or later protection will have to go and the challenge of 
free trade be accepted’. 
Easing of restrictions on foreign ownership of industry in Control of Manufactures Acts 1932 & 
1934. Acts repealed in 1964. 
Shannon Free Airport Development Company (SFADCO) established to promote industrial 
development in the Shannon area. 
Adapted from: Review of Irish industrial policy and performance (2003), by the Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment 
 
Fianna Fail won a landslide victory which was aided when the incumbents plan at 
redrawing every constituency in the country backfired. What followed was a return to 
Keynesian economics which had served the country so poorly in the first half of the 
century. The economy performed badly as output growth aned and employment in 
manufacturing fell, with major job losses in Irish owned industry. There were also job 
losses in foreign owned companies, but these were mostly confined to the low-tech 
sectors of textiles and engineering. The productivity gap between the Irish workforce and 
their European counterparts was reduced over the period from the 1970’s to the 1990’s as 
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the economy shifted towards the production of more high-tech goods like electronics and 
pharmaceuticals.  
The Review of Irish industrial policy, 20032, identifies three main reasons for the 
relatively poor performance of the Irish economy from 1960 up to the 1990’s. First, the 
legacy of protectionist policies left Ireland at a competitive disadvantage in international 
markets. Second, in comparison to other European cou tries, the dependency ratio in 
Ireland – ratio of people outside the workforce to the number in the workforce – 
increased significantly from the 1970’s to 1980’s. And finally, a macroeconomic climate 
that was not conducive to achieving sustained growth. Combined, these factors made 
doing business in Ireland very difficult. Furthermore, high inflation coupled with large 
government borrowings led to severe taxation of income; a vicious circle that was 
difficult to break out of. These difficult economic conditions in the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
which were underpinned by a failure to create enough sustainable jobs for a growing 
workforce, led to searching assessments of enterpris  policy. In 1982 Telesis, an 
American Consultancy group conducted the first review of industrial policy for the 
National Economic and Social Council3. The Telesis Report noted that Irelands “colonial 
past and the need to focus energies on goals of political independence early in the 
century, its small size and its relative geographic isolation from the main body of Europe 
have all been significant hindrances to industrial development”.  This report was 
followed in 1992 by the Culliton Report4 and the O’Driscoll Report 20045.  
                                                
2
 Conducted by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. 
3
 National Economic and Social Council. (1982). Review of Industrial Policy: A Report Prepared by the Telesis 
Consultancy Group (Dublin: NESC). 
4
 A Time for Change: Industrial Policy for the 1990s. (1992) Report of the Industrial Review Group. Published by the 
Stationary Office, Dublin. 
5
 Ahead of the Curve –  Ireland’s Place in the Global Economy (2004). The Enterprise Strategy Group. 
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The aim of this investigation is to identify to what extent industrial policy has focused on 
incentivising and supporting creation of new and existing companies and to what extent it 
has focused on implementing a complete legislative framework to assist entrepreneurs in 
failed attempts at success.  
The O’Driscoll Report noted that one of the main obstacles blocking the progress in 
developing a more entrepreneurial society is the “deep-rooted prejudice against failure in 
business”, and that the stigma attached to failure is a deterrent on entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to try again. The European Commission (2003: 12) also commented that 
insolvency legislation should “be reviewed to reduce barriers to making a fresh start for 
honest entrepreneurs.”  
In a further European Commission report, the expert group on ‘Restructuring, 
Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start’ (2003), pointed to four main focus areas; 
• Early warning 
• Legal system 
• Fresh start 
• Social attitudes  
These topics were discussed at a series of five meetings, attended by experts from 22 
different countries. Each area was discussed and specific recommendations concerning 
each topic were made.  
On the subject of legal systems, a conservative legal system towards bankruptcy can act 
as a deterrent to ‘fresh start’ entrepreneurs, in two ways.  First there are the direct legal 
consequences of failing, like economic and personal sanctions and secondly there are 
indirect consequences, which influence societies attitudes to failure, like the stigma 
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caused as a result of losing the family home, having to resign from ones job etc. It is now 
well accepted that entrepreneurs who fail in business l arn from their experiences and the 
report found that the “legal system should clearly distinguish between fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent bankruptcies and be more understanding in the latter case”. It also called 
on legislators to be aware of the factors that can le d to this stigma. (Best Project on 
Restructuring, Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start’, 2003: 23).  
 
3. ANALYSING THE THREE MAIN REPORTS ON INDUSTRIAL P OLICY IN 
IRELAND 
The method of categorising the recommendations of the reports borrows from the work 
of Dennis (2004) where he differentiates between the different policy approaches 
governments can take in terms of promoting entrepreneurship and small businesses. This 
paper expands on the framework set out by Dennis and thereby allows for further 
inference regarding the focus of Irish industrial and enterprise policies.  
 
3.1 Dennis’s typology of public policy 
According to Dennis governments generally follow two different approaches towards 
small business and or entrepreneurship policy. The first approach is reducing obstacles to 
entry and growth (Dennis used the term ‘impediments’). By taking this approach to 
entrepreneurship / small business policy, governments aim “to reduce, hold minimal, or 
eliminate barriers to entry and growth that would not be present were it not for 
government intervention or business anti-competitiv behaviour” (Dennis, 2004: 19). The 
second approach used by governments is provision of assistance, which includes both 
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financial and non-financial support, for example provision of advice on issues relating to 
starting a business. By examining the different policy approaches used Dennis has 
created a typology of general policy environments of a country. This typology is 
presented in table 2. Impediments or ‘barriers to entry’ are represented on the x-axis.  
These barriers are labelled as being either high or low, meaning that there are many or 
few barriers. Direct assistance programmes are repres nted on the vertical, or y-axis and 
these are also subdivided into two groups; again either high or low. This framework 
allows for a simple observation regarding the policy orientations of different 
governments. Section 4 will deal with this issue in more detail.    




















 High Impediments  Low Impediments 
Source: Dennis (2004) 
 
3.1.1 Expanding on Dennis’s framework 
Dennis argues that many countries do not follow an entrepreneurship stimulating 
approach to policy making, but rather have in place, policies to support existing small 
businesses. To uncover the extent to which this applies to Ireland, we have expanded on 
Dennis’s categorisation of policy approaches. In this paper we pull apart the first policy 
approach of removing barriers to entry, expansion and growth, into two separate 
categories. The two new categories of policy approaches will be, (1) reducing barriers to 
entry and (2) reducing barriers to expansion and growth. The former fits better with 
 12 
stimulating the creation of new ventures, while thelatter is more about supporting 
existing firms. The third category remains the same; th  provision of advice and financial 
support. A fourth category labelled ‘Insolvency relat d’ and a fifth category ‘Not directly 
relevant’ will also be added. Any recommendation that relates to, or mentions insolvency 
legislation, will fall into the fourth category while any recommendation which does not 
directly apply to any of the first four categories will be assigned to category five. 
Addition of these extra categories for classifying recommendations will not alter our 
ability to place policy orientation into Dennis’s original typology, but it will allow for a 
discussion on the focus of policy making in Ireland.  
This next section will examine the three major policy influencing documents with the aim 
of identifying the key recommendations arising out of each report. These 
recommendations will be classified according to theexpanded version of Dennis’s 
framework. This will allow us to place Irish policy making within one of the four 
quadrants. The first report this paper will look at is, A Review of Industrial Policy, 
carried out by the Telesis Consultancy Group at the request of the National Economic and 
Social Council (NESC), which was published in February 1982.  
 
3.2 The Telesis Report 1982 
The Telesis Consultancy Group’s report set out to “ensure that the Irish government’s 
industrial policy is appropriate to the creation of an internationally competitive industrial 
base in Ireland which will support increased employment and higher standards of living” 
(p. 3). This review, 242 pages and 10 chapters, is the longest of the three commissioned 
reports and is broken into three main parts. Section one describes the objectives and 
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justifications for the review. Section two provides an overview of Irish industrial policy 
of the time, and section three presents an assessment of those policies as well as 
recommendations on the direction of future policy. Telesis looked at the make up of 
foreign owned companies in Ireland to identify which sectors performed best, which 
sectors added most value to the economy and which sector  represented sustainable areas 
of job creation and retention. Job retention or defensibility was an important concern as 
there had been a very high turn over of jobs in foreign industries over the period 1960-
1980. 
Many foreign companies were enticed by the attractive tax breaks and grants, as well as 
low wage costs in Ireland, and from 1973 to 1982 the number of people employed in 
foreign owned companies increased by 22,000 to 80,000 people, or 34% of the total 
manufacturing workforce. However job turnover in these firms was very high, with the 
report stating that nearly 17,000 jobs had been lost in foreign owned firms from 1973 to 
1982.  
Looking at electrical engineering companies, Telesis found that for all the high tech firms 
operating in this sector, most companies had only established basic manufacturing 
satellites in the country. Very few of the foreign owned companies undertook any 
significant level of marketing, research and development or integrated manufacturing in 
Ireland (Exhibit 4.16, p. 375).  As most Irish electrical engineering operations did not 
possess key skills or processes, they would not be indispensible locations, during times of 
reduced growth. Thus sustaining employment in this industry would be difficult. 
The report produced similar findings for mechanical engineering businesses, that is, the 
majority of employment was of low skilled workers for assembly line work. Additionally, 
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only 6% of all US mechanical engineering firms had a base in Ireland. The main reason 
for this is that Ireland, as a developing country was not suitable for investment of 
mechanical engineering firms. These firms are highly interrelated (supply companies for 
components) and dependent to a large degree on apprenticed labour, which caused them 
to form in clusters (p.144). The report concluded that the vast number of projects in 
mechanical engineering industries would not increase the skill profile of the workforce 
and overcoming this obstacle would be extremely difficult (p. 150). Pharmaceuticals 
companies represented 56% of total investment by US companies in Ireland at the time of 
the report, as well as 68% of all income earned by US companies in Ireland. This meant 
that return on investment from the pharmaceutical industry was higher than any other 
industry in Ireland. However the report found that “[n]one of the Irish operations could 
easily operate independently of their parent companies”, as very little R&D was 
performed in Ireland, most raw materials were sourced internationally and that Ireland 
lacked the scale requirements  for process development as well as for capital investment.  
Nearly all foreign owned manufacturing companies in Ireland lacked any real 
sophistication or strategic importance to the parent companies. The report sums this up by 
stating that foreign owned companies, “with few exceptions do not embody the key 
competitive activities of the businesses in which they participate; do not employ 
significant numbers of skilled workers; and are notsignificantly integrated into traded 
and skilled sub-supply industries in Ireland” (p.151); continued investment from these 
companies could therefore be difficult to sustain. Although the report noted that there was 
a widespread acknowledgement of these facts, there was a perception that this would 
change in time, as industrial groups developed strategies to deepen the level of 
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integration and increased efforts to improve the level of highly educated people in the 
workforce. 
It recommended that policies offering attractive grants and tax incentives to foreign 
owned companies should be revised, as these were th main factors attracting foreign 
firms to Ireland. A summary of the recommendations f the Telesis Report can be found 
in Table 3. Included in the summary are the recommendations towards developing 
indigenous industry in Ireland as well as recommendations to the government on the need 
for it to assume a more active role in policy making. 
 
3.2.1 Categorising recommendations of the Telesis Report 
The next step was to look at each recommendation and place them into one of the five 
categories i.e. (1) ‘reducing barriers to entry’, (2) ‘reducing barriers to expansion and 
growth’, (3) ‘support’, or (4) ‘insolvency related’. Some of the recommendations do not 
fall into any of the three categories and therefore were place in an additional category 
labelled (5) ‘not directly relevant’. It is also possible that a recommendation could be 
considered to effect more than one of the categories, like for example recommendation 
no. 3; a substantial increase in funds devoted to the development of indigenous export 
businesses. This was deemed to fall under ‘provision of support’ as well as having the 
effect of ‘reducing barriers to expansion and growth’. When the recommendation was 
considered relevant to a category it was labelled with a ‘1’ otherwise it was given a ‘0’. 
Placing the recommendations into the different categori s was not always clear-cut and 
depended to a certain degree on the authors understanding of the effect that each 
recommendation would have. For reliability four other post-graduates were given the list 
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of recommendations and asked to categorise them into any of the five categories. 
Table 3 
Recommendations of the Telesis Report 
Budget levels and Resource Allocation 
 
1. A substantial reduction of average grant levels for many foreign-owned firms locating in 
Ireland. 
 
2. A sharp reduction of grants given to indigenous companies for non-traded businesses 
(with the exception of high-skilled sub-supply industries). 
 
3. A substantial increase in funds devoted to the development of indigenous export 
businesses. 
The Development of Indigenous Industry 
 
4. The development effort aimed toward new indigenous industry must be reorganized to 
emphasize the building of structurally strong Irish companies rather than strong 
agencies to assist weak companies. 
 
5. The Government should encourage greater participation by the large indigenous 
financial community in traded and skilled sub-supply businesses in Ireland.  
 
6. The grants available for the indigenous industry should address specific cost penalties 
and should be directed to the long-term resolution of these penalties. 
 
7. Consideration should be given to further use of loan, loan guarantee, redeemable equity 
and participative loans, for providing incentives to foreign firms. 
 
8. In order to spur indigenous industry development better advantage should be sought 
from foreign companies operating in Ireland. 
 
9. New joint ventures should be undertaken to oversee the development of Ireland’s 
resource-based industries. 
 
10. Ireland’s industry associations should play a more direct role in assisting the 
development of their industries. 
The Control of Irish Industrial Policy 
 
11. Better means are necessary to measure the progress of Ireland’s industrial policy. 
 
12. Government should gain better control of tax-based leasing and Section 84 
distributions. 
13. The Government departments should reassume a more active policy role.  
Of the thirteen recommendations, six were deemed to fall into the category ‘not directly 
relevant’ (These were recommendations no. 1, 2, 6, 11, 12 and 13, from Table 3). The 
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results of the codification are presented in Table 4. Along the top of the table are the 
different categories; while on the side of the table are the specific recommendations. For 
simplification the recommendations that were categorised as being not relevant, have 
been excluded from Table 4. The same method was used in analysing the other two 
reports but because of the large number of recommendations made in the subsequent 
reports, the tables have not been reproduced.  
Only one of the recommendations fell under the category of ‘reducing barriers to entry’, 
six were aimed at ‘reducing barriers to expansion and growth’, four for ‘provision of 
advice, support and finance’ while none dealt with the topic of insolvency.  Figure 1 
gives a graphical representation of the percentage of r commendations (proportional to 
the total number of recommendations in the report) that fall under each category. This 
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Budget levels and Resource Allocation     
A substantial increase in funds devoted to the 
development of indigenous export businesses. 
0 1 1 0 
The Development of Indigenous Industry     
The development effort aimed toward new indigenous 
industry must be reorganized to emphasize the building 
of structurally strong Irish companies rather than strong 
agencies to assist weak companies. 
0 1 0 0 
The Government should encourage greater 
participation by large indigenous financial community in 
traded and skilled sub-supply  
businesses in Ireland.  
0 1 1 0 
Consideration should be given to further use of loan, 
loan guarantee, redeemable equity and participative 
loans, for providing incentives to foreign firms. 
1 1 1 0 
In order to spur indigenous industry development better 
advantage should be sought from foreign companies 
operating in Ireland. 
0 1 0 0 
New joint ventures should be undertaken to oversee 
the development of Ireland’s resource-based industries. 
0 1 0 0 
Ireland’s industry associations should play a more 
direct role in assisting the development of their 
industries.  
0 0 1 0 
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3.3 The Culliton Report 1992 
“Until more people are prepared to undertake the risks associated with business 
we will continue to experience only modest progress” 
Entitled “A Time for Change: Industrial Policy for the 1990s”, this report was submitted 
to the Minister for Industry and Commerce by the Industrial Policy Review Group 
(chaired by Jim Culliton). Two major problems were set out at the beginning of the report 
as being of primary importance; “the shocking level of unemployment” and the 
“crippling level of government indebtedness”. The rport also pointed towards a 
comparative weakness of Irish indigenous industry compared to foreign-owned 
companies and called for greater commitment to developing Irish indigenous industry. It 
also sought a broader approach to policy formulation f r industry and made 
recommendations on a range of relevant public policy areas, including, taxation, 
infrastructure, education, enterprise and technology, direct support for industry, 
institutional strengthening and the food industry. It also recommended reducing reliance 
on industrial grants, as well as promoting the development of industrial clusters focused 
on niches of national competitive advantage. This follows on from observations made in 
the Telesis report, stating that many US mechanical engineering firms did not locate in 
Ireland because of the  high degree of interrelatedness within the industry (supply 
companies for components) and because the degree of dependence on apprenticed labour 
caused them to form in clusters (A Review of Industrial Policy, p.144).  
Regarding taxation the report stated that foreign ow ed firms benefited more from low 
corporation tax than indigenous firms and that it has led to complex tax avoidance 
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schemes which has had the affect of channelling the benefits of the low tax rate away 
from manufacturing. Reform in this area, according to the report “should help to refocus 
the entrepreneurial effort” and it concluded that negative attitudes towards enterprise and 
business failure were the main obstacles to developing an entrepreneurial economy (A 
Time for Change, p. 22). 
 
3.3.1 Categorising the recommendations of the Culliton Report 
Fifty two recommendations were made in the report; recommendations were broken into 
six main categories, (1) taxation, (2) infrastructure, (3) education, enterprise and 
technology, (4) direct support for industry, (5) institutional strengthening and (6) the food 
industry. These recommendations and their effect on he different categories of benefit 
topology were very clearly identifiable, for example the recommendations on 
infrastructure were deemed to have very little effect on any of the categories and 
therefore mainly fell into the category of not directly relevant. Under the heading 
institutional strengthening all of the recommendations were considered to fall under the 
category of providing advice and financial assistance. There is a significant difference in 
the effects that the recommendations in the Telesis report and those from the Culliton 
report have on the different categories of Dennis's framework. In Culliton fewer of the 
recommendations made were considered to affect either of the first two categories of 
Dennis’s expanded policy approach framework, i.e. either reduce the barriers to entry or 
reduce the barriers to expansion and growth. However th re are significantly more 
recommendations in Culliton which fall under the category of providing advice and 
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financial assistance to entrepreneurial firms and SMEs. The recommendations have been 
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3.4 The O'Driscoll Report 2004 
Ahead of the Curve – Ireland’s Place in the Global Economy 
This report, produced by the Enterprise Strategy Group and chaired by Mr. Eoin 
O’Driscoll, was submitted to Ms Mary Harney, Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment. Mr. O’Driscoll was praising of the two preceding reports and commented 
in particular on the focus in developing a more selective approach to attracting Foreign 
Direct Investment. The Telesis Report of 1982 pointed o the fact that most foreign 
owned firms in Ireland “were generally manufacturing satellites”. As a result the White 
Paper on Industrial Policy (1984) was published andthis led to the reorganisation of the 
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Industrial Development Authority giving separate divisional responsibility to foreign and 
indigenous firms (O’Driscoll, 2004: 5).   
The Culliton Report of 1992 mentioned the importance of creating a competitive business 
environment to the development of enterprise and O’Driscoll noted that there had been a 
huge improvement in the enterprise environment in the period 1993-2003. Indeed the 
Irish economy performed exceptionally well in the pr ceding decade, with the number of 
people in employment increasing from 1.2 million to 1.8 million6, unemployment falling 
from over 15% to less than 5%7 and the value of exports increasing from €28.5 billion to 
€109.3 billion.  
Table 5: Factors Influencing Economic Improvement 
External Factors Domestic Factors 
• Positive effects of trade and 
global trade and the expansion 
of the US economy. 
• Growth of FDI globally in 
1990’s and in Europe under 
impetus of single European 
market. 
• Favourable exchange rate trends 
up to 2002. 
• Strategic policy decisions to improve 
human capital and encourage FDI from the 
1960’s. 
• Enhancement of enterprise environment 
created by reform of public finances, 
reductions in taxation and wage moderation 
under national partnership agreements.  
• Demographic trends that ensured labour 
supply did not limit growth potential. 
Source: Ahead of the Curve 2004 
                                                
6 
Central Statistics Office (CSO), Quarterly National Household Survey, Quarter 4, 2003.  
7 
Department of Finance, Budgetary and Economic Statistics, 2004. 
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The reasons for this success were summarised in theDepartment of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment’s Review of Industrial Performance and Policy 2003. A range of external 
and internal factors were given and these are present d in the table below.  However the 
2004 report also pointed out a source of potential problems for the future when it stated 
that: 
“Until now, Ireland’s principal enterprise strengths have been in the operational 
aspects of manufacturing and services, rather than in markets and product 
development. This is particularly true of the foreign-owned sector, which accounts 
for most of our exports and which, for the most part, p oduces goods that were 
designed elsewhere, to satisfy market requirements that were specified elsewhere, 
and sold by other people to customers with whom the Irish operation has little 
contact and over whom it has little influence”.  
Furthermore it also noted that while the majority of foreign owned companies in Ireland 
were operating in high value sectors such as pharmaceuticals and IT, most companies by 
global standards are situated at a relatively low pint in the value chain. The activities 
which underpin the competitive strength of parent companies such as R&D and 
Sales/Marketing are not located within Irish operations. With increasing labour cost and 
emulation of low rates of corporation tax by other countries, this puts Ireland at a 
disadvantage in attracting and indeed retaining FDIin Ireland. Given the proportion of 
exports that come from foreign owned companies a change in the level of FDI would 
have a significant impact on the Irish economy.  
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3.4.1 Categorising the recommendations of the O’Driscoll Report  
The O’Driscoll report of 2004 contained in total 64different recommendations, which 
fell under three main headings (1) Building Competitive Advantage, (2) Essential 
Conditions and (3) The Role of The Enterprise Development Agencies. The headings and 
subheadings are presented in Table 6, but the recommendations have been excluded 
because of the bulkiness of the text.  
In the 2004 report 15% of recommendations were focused on lowering barriers to 
establishing a new enterprise.  
Table 6:  Main Headings From Ahead of The Curve (2004) 
Building Competitive Advantage 
Market Expertise 
Expertise in Technology -Product and Service Development 
Business Networks  
Skills, Education and Training  
Up-skilling the Existing Workforce and Raising Education Levels 
Augmenting the Skills Base 
Taxation 
Effective, Agile Government  
Essential Conditions 
Cost Competitiveness 
Infrastructural Requirements  
Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
Management Capability 
The Role of the Enterprise Development Agencies 
     Meeting Future Needs  
     Skills Required in the Enterprise Development Agencies 
Source: Ahead of the Curve, Ireland’s Place in the Global Economy (2004) 
This figure is significantly higher that the previous two reports. 23% of recommendations 
were considered to come under the category of lowering barriers to growth, 73% in the 
category of providing advice support and finance and 12% were regarded as being not 
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relevant to any of the set out categories. Once again none of the recommendations 
referred to or related in any way to insolvency legislation or insolvency frameworks. 
The recommendations are presented graphically in figure 3 and interestingly what stands 
out is the dramatic increase in the number of recommendations which were related to 
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4. PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SMES  
In recent years governments have devoted increasingly larger amounts of tax payer’s 
money to nurture the development and growth of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs). Policy makers have also come to recognise the importance of this as a major 
source of job creation, innovation and competitiveness (Stel, Storey, Thurik, Wennekers, 
2006). The general goal of such policies has been to strengthen the existing base of small 
enterprises by ensuring that they are not disadvantaged because of their small size and by 
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enabling them to survive in competitive markets (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2002). 
Internationally there have been many different approaches to SME / entrepreneurship 
policy, with governments often alternating between supports or direct assistance. 
Provision of finance; directly or indirectly, provision of guidance and access to advice on 
a wide range of issues. Governments have also tried to positively influence the start-up 
rate of new businesses by means of grants, tax relief and educational programmes8. In 
addition to providing direct assistance to entrepreneurs and SMEs, governments can also 
focus on lowering 'burdens' to entrepreneurial activity. Compliance with regulation or the 
levels of bureaucratic red tape in the operating enviro ment are some of the examples of 
the burdens faced by entrepreneurs. As already mention d in section 3, Dennis (2004) 
usefully distinguishes between the different policy approaches chosen by governments; 
(1) the provision of assistance and (2) the reduction of burdens9, and has created a 
typology of general policy environments of a country using these distinctions. Of the four 
policy environments described by Dennis (2004) and presented in table 2, there are two 
main policy approaches that are routinely focused on by governments: (1) Lowering 
barriers to establishment, expansion and growth and (2) Providing advice, support and 
finance from public funds. Developing countries have high barriers to entry coupled with 
very little direct assistance in the form of financial or advisory services. 
Therefore developing countries would come under the first quadrant, labelled ‘Limiting’. 
Table 7 is the same as table 2 but includes examples of countries which have varying 
entrepreneurship / SME policy environments. The USA according to Dennis falls into the 
                                                
8
 Examples of these policies are provided by Storey (2003). 
9
 Instead of ‘burdens’ the term ‘impediments’ is used by Dennis (2004). According to Stel, Storey, Thurik, Wennekers, 
(2006) the term ‘impediments’ has obvious negative connotations, implying that entrepreneurs are prevented in 
some way from starting a business.  
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quadrant labelled ‘Competing’ compared to the rest of the developed world, as it has few 
barriers to entry and growth and low direct assistance. Additionally, Dennis notes that 
lowering barriers to entry and growth has been the primary American policy effecting 
entrepreneurs in the USA since the early 1970s. Most European countries would lie in the 
quadrant labelled ‘Compensating’. Countries in thisquadrant are characterised as having 
many barriers to entry and growth on one hand, and to compensate for this heavy 
regulation there are many forms of support programmes which offer financial and non-
financial support. Reasons for having many barriers to entry and expansion or in other 
words, heavily regulated markets, are both numerous and contentious. Protection of 
consumers is an obvious reason. There must of course be regulations preventing non-
qualified persons from practicing as medical doctors. On the other hand some authors 
have argued that politicians extort rent in heavily regulated markets and therefore 
consumer protection is not the primary goal of regulation10. In an effort to emulate the 
success of the USA in creating wealth and new jobs since the 1970s the European 
Council in Lisbon 2000 set out to recast the EU’s approach to entrepreneurship, adopting 








                                                
10
 See Dennis (2004) for a more complete discussion on competition and regulation. 
 28 






























High Low  
Impediments 
Source: Dennis (2004) 
 
 
5. Findings and discussion  
Both the Telesis and Culliton reports of 1982 and 1992 point at the comparative 
weakness of Irish indigenous industry compared to foreign owned companies. They both 
emphasise the importance of developing native firms’ capacities to compete in 
international markets in order to achieve economies of scale in manufacturing. However 
analysis included in the O’Driscoll report (2004) highlights the fact that there has been 
almost no growth in the exports of indigenous Irish industry since the publication of the 
Telesis report in 1982. This is in spite of the recommendations of that report which 
outlined the importance of building strong Irish companies which were export oriented. 
When we look at a graphical representation of the recommendations of the three reports 
in figure 4, something interesting appears to be happening regarding the 
recommendations relating to the reduction of barriers to entry and those relating to the 
reduction of barriers to expansion and growth. Every decade there has been a declining 
proportion of recommendations aimed at reducing the barriers to expansion and growth, 
while there has been a slight increase in the proporti n recommending reducing the 
barriers to entry. And in O’Driscoll (2004) the relative difference in the proportion of 
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recommendations addressing these first two policy approaches is smaller than in the 
preceding reports. However, while this would suggest a lean towards a more 
entrepreneurship stimulating approach, the proportion of recommendations which relate 
to the provision of financial support and advisory services are significantly greater in the 
2004 report than in the either of the first two. In fact we find that over 70% of the 
recommendations in O’Driscoll (2004) relate to the provision of advice and financial 
support, up from around 60% in Culliton (1992) and 30% in Telesis (1982). Considering 
the increase in the support framework available to ntrepreneurs it’s possible to infer that 
there are still significant barriers to starting and running a business in Ireland. From this 
perspective, the policy environment in Ireland according to Dennis’s categorization 
would have to be described as ‘Compensating’, i.e. ‘high impediments’ coupled with 
‘high direct assistance’. 
This observation signifies a continued move towards policies which attempt to 
incentivise entrepreneurs by offering them a range of different assistance schemes. 
Furthermore, the reports point to a growing appreciation of the stigma associated with 
failure, the Culliton Report of 1992 for example mentioned the “deep rooted prejudice 
against failure in business”. In spite of this awareness we can identify no attempt in any 
of the three reports to make recommendations about improving the frameworks that 
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If Ireland is to become a truly entrepreneurial nation and fulfil its role in helping Europe 
to become one the most entrepreneurial areas in the world by 2010, there has to be a clear 
understanding of the factors which will create such an outcome.  
Our analysis supports the contention that Irish policy has a resolute focus on 
interventions to support successful risk taking, and has assiduously avoided considering 
reducing the consequences of failure. This conclusion has obvious implications for 
government policy on entrepreneurship and insolvency, as well as contributing to the 
academic discourses on these themes. It also leads to the question of the suitability of the 
current Irish legislative framework on the stated desire to create an entrepreneurial 
society. 
Insolvency legislation in Ireland has remained largely unchanged since its Victorian 
origins; the business environment however is changing at an ever increasing pace. The 
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legislation for dealing with insolvent companies is wholly unsuitable for the service 
based industry which is rapidly evolving in Ireland and which is too expensive and 
unwieldy for the vast majority of SMEs in operation here. This sentiment is not only the 
opinion of the authors of this paper, but it is one which is shared by the vast majority of 
insolvency practitioners in Ireland. Reducing the consequences and stigma of failing in 
business in Ireland is a topic that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. 
Differentiating between fraudulent and honest bankrupts would go along towards 
reducing the stigma of failure experienced by entrepreneurs and would also enable for a 
more just approach to imposing penalties on debtors, opposed to the blanket approach 
offered under the current system.  
An efficient mechanism to allow creditors and debtors to interact with each other and 
reach settlement needs to be created.  This mechanism should also take into account the 
welfare of the company, its employees and society at large.  
Many countries have taken significant steps to reform the policies affecting small 
businesses and entrepreneurs since the Lisbon Agenda in 2000 and the reports which 
followed. Irish policy makers need to examine the dir ction of enterprise policy in this 
country over the last 30 years and decide whether we are taking the necessary steps to 
create and foster an entrepreneurial society or whether we are unwittingly creating a 
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